An Examination of Hospitality Corporation Takeovers Using Earnings and Cash Flow Measurements by Ramdeen, Collin
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management
The Professional Refereed Journal of the International Association of Hospitality
Financial Management Educators
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 4
2018
An Examination of Hospitality Corporation
Takeovers Using Earnings and Cash Flow
Measurements
Collin Ramdeen
Florida Gulf Coast University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Hospitality Financial Management by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ramdeen, Collin (2018) "An Examination of Hospitality Corporation Takeovers Using Earnings and Cash Flow Measurements,"
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/7ejv-r681
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol26/iss2/4
© 2018 International Association of Hospitality Financial Management Education
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2018, VOL. 26, NO. 2, 87–96
https://doi.org/10.7275/7ejv-r681
An Examination of Hospitality Corporation Takeovers Using Earnings and 
Cash Flow Measurements
Collin Ramdeen
Lutgert College of Business, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, FL
ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the ability of cash flow and earnings- based measures of return in the hospi-
tality industry to assess the differences between target companies and their industries and to explain 
target companies’ abnormal returns during takeover periods. Target company abnormal returns 
observed during takeover periods are significantly related to both the difference between target 
company and average industry earnings to total assets and the difference in cash flow to total assets. 
Abnormal returns are negatively related to the difference in earnings to total assets, suggesting that 
target company assets are underutilized. The difference between target company and target indus-
try cash flow to total assets is positively related to target company abnormal returns, indicating that 
acquiring companies value the near- term cash flow of target companies.
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Introduction
Corporate takeovers continue to get attention from 
both academics and practitioners (Kiymaz, 2013). 
Takeover activities tend to be the greatest in periods 
of general economic expansion (Lessard, Lucea, & 
Vives, 2013). The motivations for takeover activi-
ties are building company capabilities, general eco-
nomic integration, and corporate growth strategies 
(Kiymaz, 2013; Lessard, Lucea, & Vives, 2013).
Canina (2009) indicated that in 2007 there were 
435 hospitality related takeovers worldwide with a 
total value of $109.7  billion. Corporate takeovers 
are major events for individual firms and some-
times even for entire industries. It is not surprising 
that the wealth effects of mergers attract significant 
attention in financial research (Free, Hadlock, & 
Pierce, 2012). Jarrel, Brickley, and Netter (1988), 
using the stock price reactions during a short win-
dow around announcement dates, reported impor-
tant gains from takeovers. Wealth gains accrue 
almost entirely to the target company shareholders. 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) presented 
evidence that the method of payment has an impact 
on the reaction of stock markets to the takeover 
announcement. Acquiring companies that pay with 
stock tend to earn significant and negative abnor-
mal returns around the announcement date, while 
acquirers that finance the transaction with cash 
earn no statistically significant abnormal returns 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001).
Some of the explanations proposed for takeovers 
include increase in market power (Weber, 2004), 
improvement in target management (Andrade, 
Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001), production and distri-
bution efficiencies and mitigation of hold- up prob-
lems (Williamson, 1975), and tax advantages (Heron 
& Lie, 2002). The empirical evidence suggests the 
overall gains from takeovers are small, with the tar-
get shareholders capturing most of the incremental 
value. Using abnormal stock returns around take-
over announcements as a proxy for value creation, 
Andrade et  al. (2001) report the mean combined 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirers 
and targets is 1.8% over the period 1973– 1998. The 
average CARs for the targets and the acquirers are 
16% and − 0.7%, respectively (Andrade et al., 2001).
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Low performance of stock acquirers can be related 
to the signaling hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
(1984). In their information asymmetry model, a 
cash financed takeover is interpreted by the market 
as good news and a stock- for- stock takeover as bad 
news. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a model 
in which the financial markets are strong- form 
inefficient, leading to the misevaluation of firms. 
One of the implications of their model is overval-
ued acquirers make stock- for- stock bids for under-
valued targets; the method of payment in mergers 
reveals the prior misevaluation, causing a negative 
market reaction.
In the hospitality industry the objectives of take-
over are expansion, growth, and maximization of 
shareholder value (Hsu & Jang, 2007). According 
to Tsai, Pan, and Lee (2011), takeover in the hospi-
tality industry results in major benefits in the form 
of economies of scale and synergy for managers, 
shareholders, and institutional investors. However, 
Canina (2009) indicated that in theory the benefits 
are true, but there are several problems that could 
make the financial benefits less likely to material-
ize. Canina (2009) also stipulated that two- thirds of 
takeovers fail to create shareholder value.
Prior studies on takeover in the hospitality indus-
try used comparative analysis to examine motives 
(Quek, 2011), market analysis, and accounting mea-
sures (Hsu & Jang, 2007; Yang, Qu, & Kim, 2009). 
This research utilizes cash flow and earnings- based 
measures of return to assess the differences in the 
characteristics of target companies or acquired com-
panies compared to their industries and to examine 
the association of these measures with target compa-
nies’ abnormal returns during takeover using mod-
ified models from Stokes and Neuburger (1998). 
Practitioners and the business media have raised con-
cerns that the excessive focus on accounting earnings 
rather than cash flow leads to suboptimal investment 
decisions (Sloan, 1996; Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2007).
Literature Review
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Takeovers
Accrual accounting earnings has been a matter of 
interest for managers, current and prospective own-
ers of companies, and financial analysts in the hos-
pitality industry (Andrew, Damitio, & Schmidgall, 
2007; Canina, 2009; Tsai, Pan, & Lee, 2011). Cash 
flow, a useful gauge of liquidity, has also been of 
interest and in recent decades has received greater 
attention from academics and accounting reg-
ulators (Andrew, Damitio, & Schmidgall, 2007; 
Canina, 2009; Tsai, Pan, & Lee, 2011). Its support-
ers view joint earnings and cash flow reporting as 
an improvement over the issuance of conventional 
accrual accounting alone (e.g., Lee, 1972; Ashton, 
1976; Ijiri, 1978; Belkaoui, 1988). A number of stud-
ies have examined, with mixed results, the useful-
ness of cash flow versus earnings for the purpose of 
(1) predicting financial distress (Beaver, 1966; Casey 
& Bartezack, 1985; Gentry, Newbold, & Whitford, 
1985; Largay & Stickney, 1980); or (2) determin-
ing the information content of financial statements 
(Rayburn, 1986; Wilson, 1987; Bowen, Burgstahler, 
& Daley, 1987; Bernard & Stober, 1989).
If takeover bids arise as a result of target firm 
undervaluation and/or managerial motives (Lev, 
1983), then cash flow and earnings measures may be 
useful tools for analyzing takeovers. Coffee (1988) 
identifies several potential reasons for target compa-
nies’ undervaluation, including the failure of man-
agement to efficiently handle a company’s assets and 
the risk aversion of managers who may be extremely 
protective of their own authority. Under this sce-
nario, motivation for a takeover bid stems from the 
bidder’s desire to acquire an undervalued firm, dis-
place current management, and exploit the disparity 
between the target’s potential and current values.
Also, if firms become takeover targets due to 
undervaluation, then it is possible that the eco-
nomic characteristics underlying this undervalu-
ation (e.g., inefficient use of assets) are reflected in 
their accounting- based return measures. As such, the 
earnings and cash flow to total assets ratios, relative 
to the industry standard, provide an empirical pre-
diction concerning the sources of value in takeovers 
and the characteristics of takeover targets. This pos-
sibility is addressed empirically by an examination of 
the target company’s earnings to total assets and cash 
flow to total assets in comparison with the average 
of these performance measures for companies in the 
target’s industry. The following hypotheses, stated in 
the alternative form, are tested:
H1a: D(E/TA) is less than zero.
H1b: D(CF/TA) is less than zero.
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where
E/TA = earnings to total assets ratio,
CF/TA = cash flow to total assets ratio,
D(E/TA) = difference between target company 
earnings to total assets and average earnings 
to total assets for the target company’s 
industry,
D(CF/TA) = difference between target company 
and average industry cash flow to total assets,
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) = based on data from 
the last full fiscal year prior to takeover 
resolution.
Takeover results in a gain in wealth for target com-
pany’s shareholders (Dennis & McConnelly, 1986; 
Huang & Walkling, 1987; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 
1988). Rejection of the null for H1a and H1b will 
provide some indication that target companies are 
poor performers compared to their industries. How-
ever, this alone will not demonstrate that poor per-
formance is associated with the magnitude of the bid 
in a takeover offer. The next section describes tests of 
the association between relative target/industry per-
formance and the abnormal stock returns earned by 
target company shareholders.
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Takeover Abnormal 
Returns
When companies become takeover targets due to 
managements’ failure to efficiently employ assets 
and this underperformance can be remedied by a 
change in management, then, other things being 
equal, the lower the performance of the target in 
comparison to similar companies, the greater the 
gain to the acquirer. Further, if economic perfor-
mance is proxy by the target’s accounting measures 
of return, the abnormal returns earned by target 
shareholders during the takeover period should be 
associated with target company cash flow and earn-
ings to total assets relative to the industry standard. 
Under this scenario, D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) should 
inversely proxy the extent to which an acquiring 
company could better exploit the resources of the 
target firm and, consequently, should be negatively 
related to the share price increment that the bidding 
company is willing to pay for the target. This leads to 
the second hypothesis:
H2a: D(E/TA) is negatively related to target firm 
cumulative abnormal returns observed during 
the interval from the first announcement 
of a takeover offer to the date of takeover 
resolution.
H2b: D(CF/TA) is negatively related to 
target firm cumulative abnormal returns 
observed during the interval from the first 
announcement of a takeover offer to the date 
of takeover resolution.
To analyze the extent to which D(CF/TA) and 
D(E/TA) can explain abnormal returns of targets, 
the regression in equation (1) below is estimated. 
Separate regressions of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) and on 
D(CF/TA) are also reported in the result section.
 CAR(T) = a0 + a1 D(CF/TA) + a2 D(E/TA) (1)
where
CAR(T) = the cumulative abnormal return of the 
target over the takeover contest period,
D(CF/TA) = the difference between target 
company T ’s industry, and
D(E/TA) = the difference between target 
company T ’s earnings to total assets and 
average earnings/total assets for T ’s industry.
Additional factors have been found to influence 
the magnitude of target company abnormal returns 
during the course of a takeover contest. Huang and 
Walkling (1987) have found that returns to target 
shareholders are higher when the target’s manage-
ment opposes the takeover and that more wealth is 
created in cash transactions than in takeovers con-
ducted all or partly by the exchange of securities. 
Servaes (1992) also reported that multiple bidders 
in the contest increased the returns to target share-
holders. Finally Bradley et al. (1988) note that, with 
the appearance of investment banking companies 
specializing in financing takeovers and the creation 
of anti- takeover devices, there has been a change in 
the overall merger environment. These factors may 
confound the results of the analysis shown in equa-
tion (2) below.
 CAR(T) = b0 + a1 D(CF/TA) + b2 D(E/TA) +  
 b3 CASH + b4 HF + b5 BIDS + b6 SIZE (2)
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CAR(T), D(CF/TA), and D(E/TA) are defined 
above. The control variables have the following defi-
nitions: CASH is an indicator variable equaling one if 
the takeover is primarily for cash and zero otherwise; 
HF is an indicator variable equaling one if manage-
ment’s reaction to the takeover indicates that it is 
hostile and zero if friendly; BIDS is an indicator vari-
able equaling one if there is more than one bidder for 
the target and zero if there is only one bidder; and 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity of the target firm at the beginning of the year 
in which the takeover announcement is made.
For D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) the expectations 
remain the same. Given the discussion above, the 
coefficients for CASH, HF, and BIDS are expected 
to be positive. Because SIZE is included as general 




A sample of completed takeovers was identified by 
examining the COMPUSTAT Annual Research File 
for companies delisted due to merger or acquisition 
over the period 1994– 2007. This period was selected 
because it displays characteristics of the typical take-
over through expansion (Corrao, 2012).
Companies in gaming, hotel, and restaurant 
industries were included in the sample. Informa-
tion on industry earnings, cash flow, and total assets 
were collected from the COMPUSTAT Annual 
Research File. Similar data for target companies 
was collected from the COMPUSTAT Annual 
Research File. Return data was collected from the 
CRSP Daily Return File. Other information col-
lected includes the date of the first takeover offer 
for the target firm, the form of payment (cash, secu-
rities, or mixed cash and securities), the number of 
bidding companies, and the nature of the takeover 
(the takeover was viewed as friendly unless the 
Wall Street Journal Index reported the opposition 
of management to the offer). The Wall Street Jour-
nal Index on Mergers and Acquisitions (2007) is the 
source of these information items.
The date of the first offer is the date on which the 
first bid for the firm was made. In a multi- firm bid-
ding contest, this date is not necessarily the date of 
the first bid by the firm that eventually acquired the 
target.
Analysis of Data
The final sample consists of 52 takeovers that were 
completed between 1994 and 2007. Table  1 pres-
ents the distribution of the sample by industry and 
number of takeovers. Table 2 subdivides the sample 
according to various merger characteristics. Due to 
incomplete coverage in the Wall Street Journal Index 
on Mergers and Acquisitions (2007), one or more 
merger characteristics could not be determined for 
a number of companies.
Calculation of Earnings and Cash Flow to Total 
Assets
Earnings to total assets (E/TA) is calculated as earn-
ings available to common shareholders in year t 
Table 1. Frequency Distribution of Sample by Industry 
and the Number of Takeover Targets (1994– 2007)





Table 2A. Sample Frequency of Takeovers Classified by 
Method of Payment
Method of Payment Number of Firms Percentage
Cash Payment 22 42%
Securities 16 31%
Mixed Cash and Securities 14 27%
Total 52 100%
Table 2B. Sample Frequency of Takeovers According to 
Management Reaction to Offer
Management Reaction Number of Firms Percentage
Hostile Acquisition 11 21%
Friendly Acquisition 30 60%
Unknown 10 19%
Total 52 100%
Table 2C. Sample Frequency of Takeovers Classified by 
Number of Bidders
Number of Bidders Number of Firms Percentage
1 Bidder 32 62%
2 Bidders 8 15%
3 Bidders 4 8%
Unknown 8 15%
Total 52 100%
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(data from COMPUSTAT) divided by closing total 
assets from year t-1 (data from COMPUSTAT).
The calculation of cash flow for year t (CFt) is 
shown in equation (3) below:
 CFt = Earningst + Depreciationt +  
 Deferred Taxest – (Current Assetst –  
 Casht – Current Liabilitiest) +  
 (Current Assetst-1– Casht-1–  
 Current Liabilitiest-1) (3)
where
Earnings = earnings available to common 
shareholders,
Depreciation = current depreciation 
and amortization expense (data from 
COMPUSTAT),
Deferred Taxes = current deferred tax effect 
on the income statement (data from 
COMPUSTAT),
Current Assets = total current assets,
Current Liabilities = total current liabilities (data 
from COMPUSTAT), and,
Cash = cash and short- term investments (data 
from COMPUSTAT).
Cash flow to total assets (CF/TA) is calculated as 
CFt divided by total assets as of the end of year t-1.
Estimation of Abnormal Returns
CAR(T) is calculated as follows. Daily returns from 
the CRSP file are used to estimate market model 
parameters:
 Rjs = αj + βj Rms + εjs (4)
where
Rjs = daily return on security j on day s,
Rms = value weighted return on the market on 
day s,
εjs = normally distributed error term, and,
αj and βj = firm specific parameters to be 
estimated.
An estimation period from days − 210 to − 12 rel-
ative to the date of the first public announcement 
of a merger offer (day O) is used. Day O is defined 
as the day prior to the day that the announcement 
of the offer was published in the Wall Street Journal. 
Daily abnormal returns for firm j (ARjd) are the mar-
ket model prediction errors for each day (d) in the 
cumulative period:
 ARjd = Rjd − (αj + βj Rmd) (5)
Finally, the ARjd are cumulated to form CAR(T). 
The cumulative period is from the date of the first 
announcement of a merger offer to the date of share-
holder approval of the merger. In some cases, the 
target company’s stock was delisted prior to share-
holder approval. In these cases, the cumulative of 
abnormal returns is terminated at the delisting date.
The Cash Flow and Earnings Ratios of Target Firms
The cash flow and earnings to total assets ratios 
(CF/TA and E/TA, respectively) for each of the 
target companies were computed for the three fis-
cal years preceding the resolution of the takeover. 
Average CF/TA and E/TA were also computed for 
the industries (hotel, gaming, and restaurant) of the 
target companies. E/TA and CF/TA for the target 
companies were then compared to those in their 
respective industries.
The comparisons of E/TA and CF/TA are in 
Table 3. Mean E/TA for the takeover targets in the 
three years preceding the resolution of the takeover 
are − 0.0180, −0.0230, and 0.0006. The comparative 
industry ratios are 0.0400, 0.0321, and 0.0402. The 
results of t-tests of differences between these ratios 
indicate that target companies have significantly 
lower mean E/TA ratios than the average for their 
industries in each of the three years. Mean CF/TA 
ratios of target firms are also significantly lower than 
those for their industries in the three years prior to 
resolution of the takeovers. Target companies’ mean 
CF/TA is 0.0641 three years prior to takeover resolu-
tion, 0.0059 two years prior to resolution and 0.0461 
one year prior to resolution. The related industry 
ratios are 0.1020, 0.0853, and 0.0909. Median tar-
get CF/TA is less than median industry CF/TA, and 
median target firm E/TA is greater than median 
industry E/TA, but these differences are not statis-
tically significant. These results suggest that many 
target companies exhibited lower performance than 
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other firms in their industry over an extended period 
of time prior to the resolution of the takeovers.
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Target Firm Abnormal 
Returns
Target companies’ cash flow and earnings to total 
assets are lower than their industry averages in 
the three years preceding the takeover completion. 
In this section, the differences between target com-
panies’ and industry average CF/TA and E/TA from 
the last complete fiscal year prior to the resolution 
of  the takeover [D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) respec-
tively] are employed in an attempt to explain the 
abnormal returns, which accrue to the shareholders 
of target companies during the period of the take-
over contest. Cumulative abnormal returns real-
ized on target companies’ shares are regressed on 
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA); if the value created in take-
overs is greater when target companies have lower 
cash flow and earnings per dollar of total assets rela-
tive to their industries, then the coefficients on these 
variables should be negative.
The results of regression analyses of CAR(T) on 
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA), both individually and 
jointly, are reported in Table  4. Part A reports the 
results of regressions in which CAR(T) is cumu-
lated from the date of the first announcement of a 
merger offer. Part B reports the results of regressions 
in which CAR(T) is cumulated from one week (five 
trading days) prior to the first announcement of a 
merger offer.
In Part A, column 1, the regression of CAR(T) 
on D(E/TA) is insignificant. Similarly, in column 3, 
the coefficient for D(E/TA) is insignificant at con-
ventional levels, although, in both regressions, the 
sign agrees with H2a and H2b. The coefficients for 
D(CF/TA) in the regressions reported in columns 2 
and 3 of Part A are each significantly different than 
zero, but the sign of the coefficients is positive, indi-
cating that increasing cash flow per dollar of total 
assets relative to the industry average is associated 
with higher abnormal returns for their sharehold-
ers. This result does not agree with H2a and H2b, 
which hypothesized a negative relationship between 
CAR(T) and D(CF/TA), but may be indicative of a 
desire, by acquiring companies, to quickly generate 
cash to cover the cost of the takeover. Alternatively, 
it may be related to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
theory of takeovers whereby companies are taken 
over to distribute cash flow that the target man-
agement is retaining for investment in negative net 
present value projects.
Since abnormal returns are cumulated from one 
week prior to the first public announcement of a 
merger offer, similar, but quantitatively stronger, 
results are observed. The coefficients for D(E/TA) 
in columns l and 3 of Part B remain positive and, 
in  these regressions, are significant. D(CF/TA) 
remains negatively correlated with CAR(T). This 
suggests that information, or speculation, about the 
merger offer was present in the market prior to 
the public announcement reported by the Wall Street 
Journal and that abnormal returns were accruing to 
target firm shareholders in advance of the offer.
Similar regression results, which include the con-
trol variables, are reported in Table  5. In general, 
the control variables add no explanatory power 
Table 3. Comparison of Target Firms’ Earnings to Total Assets Ratios (E/TA) and Cash Flow to Total Assets Ratios (CF/TA) to 
Industry Average
Year Var n
Target Firms Target Industry
t- statisticbMean Median Mean Median
t- 3a E/TA 51 − 0.0180 0.0703 0.0400 0.0630 − 2.19**
CF/TA 50 0.0641 0.1030 0.1020 0.1211 − 1.51*
t- 2 E/TA 51 − 0.0230 0.0601 0.0321 0.0463 − 2.40***
CF/TA 50 0.0059 0.0871 0.0853 0.1087 − 2.11**
t- 1 E/TA 50 0.0006 0.0611 0.0402 0.0497 − 1.69**
CF/I’A 50 0.0461 0.0859 0.0909 0.1029 − 1.89**
a Year t- i represents the i th complete fiscal year prior to the resolution of the takeover.
b Test of the null hypothesis that D(E/TA) D(CF/TA) equals zero.
* Significant at a = 0.10, one- tailed test.
** Significant at a = 0.05, one- tailed test.
*** Significant at a = 0.01, one- tailed test.
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to the regressions. The adjusted R2 of the regres-
sions declined, and all of the regressions in Part A, 
along with the regression in column 1 of Part B, 
have insignificant F-statistics. In the two significant 
regressions, reported in columns 2 and 3 of Part B, 
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) display the same rela-
tionship to CAR(T) as they did in the regressions 
without control variables (see Table 4). Among the 
control variables in these two regressions, only SIZE 
has significant explanatory power.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study examined the cash flow to total assets and 
earnings to total assets of a sample of 52 merger tar-
gets that were taken over in the period 1994– 2007. 
The first result of the study concerns the ability of 
cash flow and earnings-based measures of return to 
assess the differences between target companies and 
their industries. More specifically, the results cor-
roborate the general premise in the literature that 
target companies are underperformers prior to the 
acquisition compared to other companies in their 
industries. They further indicate that this low per-
formance is evident not only in an earnings-based 
measure but also when a cash flow–based measure 
is used.
Results indicate that cumulative abnormal 
returns accruing to target company shareholders are 
associated at 0.05 significance level with these mea-
sures of the relative performance of targets versus 
their industries. As hypothesized, the target com-
pany versus industry difference in earnings to total 
assets is negatively correlated with abnormal returns 
earned by target shareholders, indicating that target 
companies may be acquired to put their assets to a 
more efficient use. Contrary to the study’s hypothe-
sis, the target versus industry difference in cash flow 
to assets is positively correlated to abnormal returns 
earned by target shareholders. One interpretation is 
that, while target companies underperform relative 
to their industry in terms of cash flow generation, 
acquiring companies value cash flow in merger tar-
gets and will pay a higher price to get it. This may 
result from a desire for the acquiring company to 
cover near- term costs of the merger. Alternatively, 
Table 4. Regression Results of Target Firm Abnormal Returns on D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA)a
Part A: CAR(T) from Takeover Offer Dateb
Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA) Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) 
& D(CF/TA)
Intercept 0.231 (0.01)*** 0.159 (0.01)*** 0.192 (0.01)***
D(E/TA) − 1.401 (0.12) − 1.369 (0.12)
D(CF/TA) 1.163 (0.05)** 1.151 (0.05)**
F- statistic 2.711 (0.12) 3.986 (0.05)** 3.577 (0.05)**
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.087 0.143
n 31 30 30
Part B: CAR(T) from One Week prior to Takeover Offer Date
Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA) Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) 
& D(CF/TA)
Intercept 0.298 (0.01)*** 0.229 (0.01)*** 0.27 (0.01)***
D(E/TA) − 1.811 (0.05)** − 1.801 (0.05)**
D(CF/TA) 1.489 (0.01)*** 1.481 (0.01)***
F- statistic 4.402 (0.05)** 7.801 (0.01)*** 7.117 (0.01)***
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.167 0.2703
n 31 30 30
a D(E/TA) is the difference between target firm earnings to total assets and average earnings to total assets for the target firm’s industry. 
D(CF/TA) is the difference between target firm and average industry cash flow to total assets. D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) are calculated from data 
from the last full fiscal year prior to takeover resolution.
b The takeover offer date is the date of the first announcement of an offer for the target firm in the takeover contest. It is not necessarily the 
date of the first offer from the eventual acquirer. CAR(T) is cumulated from the offer date in Part A (one week prior to the offer date in Part 
B), 0 to the date of target firm shareholder approval or exchange delisting, whichever is earlier.
Figures reported for regression variables are coefficient (two- tailed p- value); for F- statistic, F- statistic (p- value); for n, observations.
* Significant at α = 0.10, one- tailed test.
** Significant at α = 0.05, two- tailed test.
*** Significant at α = 0.01, two- tailed test.
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while Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory is not 
directly tested here, a possible interpretation of this 
result is that target companies are being acquired to 
release, or to better invest, cash flow that previous 
management retained to invest in negative net pres-
ent value projects.
Of the 52 completed takeovers over for the period 
1994– 2007, takeover targets have mean cash flow 
and earnings to total assets below their industry 
means in each of the three fiscal years preceding the 
year in which the takeover was completed. If these 
ratios are interpreted as measures of managerial per-
formance, the implication is that target firms were 
underperformers that may have been taken over for 
a better use of their asset potential.
Abnormal returns observed for a target company 
during the takeover period are significantly related to 
the difference between the target company and tar-
get industry earnings to total assets ratios and to the 
difference in cash flow to total assets ratios. Abnor-
mal returns are negatively related to the difference 
in the earnings to total assets ratio, suggesting that 
target company assets are indeed underutilized. 
The difference between target company and target 
industry cash flow to total assets is positively related 
to target company abnormal returns, suggesting that 
acquiring companies value the near- term cash flow 
of targets.
The results of this research will be useful infor-
mation for practitioners planning to use cash flow 
and earnings-based measures to identify the types 
of target hospitality companies that will be profitable 
after takeover. The findings can also assist the man-
agement of hospitality companies in making critical 
Table 5. Regression Results of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) with Control Variables Related to Target Firm and Merger 
Characteristicsa 
Part A: CAR(T) from Takeover Offer Dateb
Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA) Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) 
& D(CF/TA)
Intercept 0.109 (0.49) − 0.181 (0.37) − 0.101 (0.60)
HF − 0.189 (0.30) − 0.251 (0.14) − 0.258 (0.12)
CASH 0.091 (0.39) 0.089 (0.41) 0.091 (0.39)
BIDS 0.131 (0.43) 0.192 (0.27) 0.188 (0.21)
D(E/TA) − 1.397 (0.48) − 1.143 (0.25)
D(CF/TA) 1.601 (0.01)*** 1.497 (0.05)**
SIZE 0.029 (0.51) 0.083 (0.05)** 0.059 (0.10)*
F- statistic 0.701 (0.63) 1.601 (0.21) 1.609 (0.19)
Adjusted R2 − 0.061 0.089 0.120
n 31 30 30
Part B: CAR(T) from One Week prior to Takeover Offer Date
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.251 (0.19) − 0.089 (0.59) 0.010 (0.93)
HF − 0.170 (0.31) − 0.226 (0.21) − 0.252 (0.13)
CASH 0.080 (0.51) 0.098 (0.39) 0.091 (0.37)
BIDS 0.088 (0.49) 0.159 (0.30) 0.171 (0.26)
D(E/TA) −1.886 (0.05)* − 1.701 (0.05)*
D(CF/TA) 1.891 (0.01)*** 1.798 (0.01)***
SIZE 0.017 (0.61) 0.068 (0.05)* 0.061 (0.18)
F- statistic 0.079 (0.56) 2.038 (0.05)* 2.501 (0.05)**
Adjusted R2 − 0.027 0.158 0.241
n 31 30 30
a D(E/TA) (D[CF/TA]) is target firm earnings to total assets (cash flow to total assets) less average earnings to total assets (cash flow to total 
assets) for the target’s industry calculated from data from the last fiscal year prior to takeover resolution. The indicator variables are: HF = 1 if 
the merger is hostile; CASH = 1 if the merger is for cash; BIDS = 1 if there is more than one bidder for the target. SIZE is the natural log of the 
target’s market value of equity at the beginning of the last year prior to the first takeover offer.
b The takeover offer date is the date of the first announcement of an offer for the target firm in the takeover contest. It is not necessarily 
the date of the first offer from the eventual acquirer. CAR(T) is cumulated from the offer date in Part A (one week prior to the offer date in 
Part B), to the date of target firm shareholder approval or exchange delisting, whichever is earlier.
Figures reported for regression variables are coefficient (two- tailed p- value); for F- statistic, F- statistic (p-value); for n, observations.
* Significant at α = 0.10.
** Significant at α = 0.05.
*** Significant at α = 0.01.
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strategic decisions relating to takeover of target hos-
pitality companies. In addition, the results contribute 
to the body of prior research supporting the fact that 
hospitality companies can benefit from expansion 
and growth through the takeover process. Finally, 
this research presents empirical findings regarding 
takeovers in the hospitality industry that was done 
for the first time using cash flow and earnings-based 
measurements in a modified model. Therefore, it 
adds to the body of empirical research on mergers 
and acquisitions in the hospitality industry.
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